"
It may be taken for granted that, in the vast majority of instances,
this degree of consideration sufficed in the case of any person honestly
desiring to take his trial; but circumstances might exist which rendered
it impossible for a man to prevent his being outlawed, and then the
right of sanctuary might be of the utmost value in staying injustice.
That the supposition is not purely imaginary is proved by a remarkable
petition of the early part of the reign of Edward I., in which John
Brown, scholar of Oxford, states that during his absence at Rome he has
been falsely appealed by a Jewess for a Christian child, pursued from
county to county, and outlawed; wherefore on his return he was put in
prison and he now prays the King's mercy, without which he cannot
go to the common law. John Brown, it is clear, did not take
sanctuary--probably because he was not apprised of the facts in time;
otherwise it would have afforded him all needful security and allowed
him a period for reflection as to the wisdom of surrendering or quitting
the realm.
The right of sanctuary must have been founded on the principle that the
guilt of the fugitive had not been established. Even the ordinary law
was laudably sensitive on this point, and care was taken not to
prejudice the accused by an apparent assumption of guilt. If a person
was charged with murder, the bailiffs were obliged to approach him with
white wands as a sign that they had no intention of committing or
provoking a breach of the peace.
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