Indeed, we not infrequently
see, even among practical educators, expressions of positive
antipathy to scientific precision of language so obviously opposed
to good sense that they can be attributed only to a failure to
comprehend the meaning of the language which they criticise.
Perhaps the most injurious effect in this direction arises from
the natural tendency of the mind, when not subject to a scientific
discipline, to think of words expressing sensible objects and
their relations as connoting certain supersensuous attributes.
This is frequently seen in the repugnance of the metaphysical mind
to receive a scientific statement about a matter of fact simply as
a matter of fact. This repugnance does not generally arise in
respect to the every-day matters of life. When we say that the
earth is round we state a truth which every one is willing to
receive as final. If without denying that the earth was round, one
should criticise the statement on the ground that it was not
necessarily round but might be of some other form, we should
simply smile at this use of language. But when we take a more
general statement and assert that the laws of nature are
inexorable, and that all phenomena, so far as we can show, occur
in obedience to their requirements, we are met with a sort of
criticism with which all of us are familiar, but which I am unable
adequately to describe.
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