To communicate to him a knowledge of words expressive of mental
states it is necessary to assume that his own mind is subject to
these states as well as our own, and that we can in some way
indicate them by our acts. That the former hypothesis is
sufficiently well established can be made evident so long as a
consistency of different words and ideas is maintained. If no such
consistency of meaning on his part were evident, it might indicate
that the operations of his mind were so different from ours that
no such communication of ideas was possible. Uncertainty in this
respect must arise as soon as we go beyond those mental states
which communicate themselves to the senses of others.
We now see that in order to communicate to our foreigner a
knowledge of language, we must follow rules similar to those
necessary for the stability of a building. The foundation of the
building must be well laid upon objects knowable by his five
senses. Of course the mind, as well as the external object, may be
a factor in determining the ideas which the words are intended to
express; but this does not in any manner invalidate the conditions
which we impose. Whatever theory we may adopt of the relative part
played by the knowing subject, and the external object in the
acquirement of knowledge, it remains none the less true that no
knowledge of the meaning of a word can be acquired except through
the senses, and that the meaning is, therefore, limited by the
senses.
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